



REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Voting versus Consensus Decision-Making in
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

Issuing Organization: Sharks Pacific

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Proposal Deadline: 30 April 2026

Anticipated Project Duration: 7 months

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1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

1.1 Overview

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) manages approximately 60% of global tuna catch from waters representing half of the Pacific Ocean. Pacific Islands Countries and Territories (PICTs) control exclusive economic zones covering approximately 30 million square kilometres within the WCPFC Convention Area and are the sovereign owners of these valuable tuna resources worth over USD \$4 billion annually in delivered value.

Despite this extraordinary resource endowment and the critical importance of effective conservation and management measures to maintain healthy fish stocks and sustainable economic benefits, the WCPFC has struggled to adopt timely and adequate measures to address urgent conservation challenges, including the rebuilding of heavily depleted or overfished stocks, the regulation of fish aggregating devices (FADs), and the strengthening of high seas compliance measures.

1.2 The Consensus Challenge

The WCPFC's decision-making system prioritizes consensus as the default method for adopting conservation and management measures (CMMs). While consensus-based decision-making can promote inclusivity and buy-in, it has also created a de facto veto system whereby individual members or small groups of states can block urgently needed conservation measures, regardless of scientific advice or the preferences of the majority.

This "consensus trap" manifests in several ways:

- **Delayed action** on critical conservation measures despite clear scientific recommendations
- **Weakened measures** through successive compromises to avoid voting
- **Strategic obstruction** by states prioritizing short-term economic gains over long-term sustainability
- **Power asymmetries** whereby distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) can block measures favoured by resource-owning PICTs
- **Erosion of PICT sovereignty** over resources within their own exclusive economic zones

The WCPFC's rules do provide for voting when consensus cannot be achieved, requiring a three-fourths majority that includes separate three-fourths majorities from both Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) members and non-FFA members (a "dual-chamber" system). However, voting is rarely used, and the structural barriers and political sensitivities around voting remain poorly understood.

1.3 Research Gap

While extensive literature exists on institutional design in international organizations and voting behaviour in forums like the UN General Assembly, rigorous game-theoretic analysis specifically examining WCPFC decision-making dynamics is notably absent. Critical questions remain unanswered:



- Under what conditions would WCPFC members rationally choose to push for a vote rather than continue seeking consensus?
- How do the dual-chamber voting requirements and other procedural rules shape coalition formation and strategic behaviour?
- What are the stability conditions for different coalitions under consensus versus voting scenarios?
- How might increased use of voting affect long-term cooperation, compliance, geopolitics, and conservation outcomes?
- What institutional modifications could make voting more politically viable while maintaining legitimacy and effectiveness?

Existing analyses have focused on:

- General RFMO performance assessments
- Flag state compliance and enforcement
- Stock assessment and harvest control rules
- Stakeholder participation mechanisms

Critically absent is a systematic, theoretically grounded analysis that maps the strategic incentives embedded in WCPFC's institutional design and examines how voting versus consensus dynamics affect member behaviour, coalition stability, and governance outcomes from a PICT-centred perspective.

2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Sharks Pacific seeks to engage a qualified game theorist or research team with expertise in institutional economics, international relations, and/or public choice theory to conduct a comprehensive analysis that will:

2.1 Primary Objectives

1. **Map the strategic structure** of WCPFC decision-making, identifying how current rules create incentives for consensus-seeking versus voting behaviour
2. **Model coalition formation dynamics** under consensus and voting scenarios, with particular attention to PICT interests and FFA coordination
3. **Analyse voting power distribution** under the dual-chamber system and identify conditions under which different coalitions could form stable majorities
4. **Assess the stability of cooperation** in a repeated-game framework, examining how voting versus consensus affects long-term reciprocity and compliance
5. **Evaluate alternative institutional designs** and their likely effects on decision-making efficiency, conservation outcomes, and distributional fairness
6. **Provide actionable insights** for PICT delegations on strategic considerations around voting, coalition building, and institutional reform

2.2 Specific Research Questions

The analysis must address the following questions:

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND STRATEGIC INCENTIVES:

- How do WCPFC's consensus requirements, dual-chamber voting rules, narrow-defeat protections, and deferral mechanisms shape member incentives and constraint collective action?
- What are the effective veto points in the current system and who holds them?
- How do these institutional features compare to other RFMOs and international environmental agreements?
- How do geopolitical considerations influence procedural and substantive decisions?

COALITION FORMATION AND STABILITY:

- What coalitions currently exist within the WCPFC (formal and informal) and what maintains their cohesion?
- Under the dual-chamber voting system, which coalitions could form stable blocs aligned within majorities?
- How do the payoff structures around key issues (tropical tuna management, observer coverage, transshipment, FAD management) affect coalition stability?
- What role do side payments, issue linkages, and informal bargaining play in maintaining or disrupting coalitions?

CONSENSUS VERSUS VOTING DYNAMICS:

- Under what conditions would a member rationally push for a vote rather than continue consensus negotiations?
- What are the reputational costs and benefits of forcing a vote?
- How do repeated interactions and the shadow of the future affect willingness to use voting?
- What factors determine when blocking consensus becomes more attractive than allowing a measure to pass?

VOTING POWER AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR:

- How is voting power distributed under the current dual-chamber system?
- Which members or coalitions hold pivotal positions in potential voting scenarios?
- How might voting behaviour differ from stated preferences during consensus negotiations?
- What signalling and strategic voting dynamics are likely to emerge?
- Long-term Cooperation and Compliance:
 - How might increased use of voting affect member willingness to comply with adopted measures?
 - What are the risks of defection, withdrawal, or retaliatory behaviour under different decision rules?
 - How do voting versus consensus outcomes affect legitimacy and political sustainability?



ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS:

- What modifications to voting procedures (e.g., SPRFMO-style conciliation, adjusted thresholds, modified chamber definitions, social justice) might improve decision-making efficiency while maintaining legitimacy?
- How would transfer mechanisms or compensation schemes affect coalition stability under voting scenarios?
- What lessons can be drawn from other RFMOs' experiences with voting and consensus?

3. SCOPE OF WORK

3.1 Required Deliverables

PHASE 1: INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DATA COLLECTION (MONTHS 1-2)

- 1. Comprehensive institutional design assessment** including:
 - Detailed mapping of WCPFC decision-making rules and procedures
 - Identification of veto points and procedural constraints
 - Comparative analysis with other RFMO decision-making systems
 - Historical analysis of voting attempts, near-votes, and consensus failures
- 2. Stakeholder mapping and preference analysis** including:
 - Identification of member state positions on key conservation issues including:
 - High seas transshipment
 - Bycatch/non-target catch accountability
 - Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing
 - Documentation of coalition structures (FFA, PNA, DWFN alignments)
 - Analysis of stated versus revealed preferences from meeting records
 - Key informant interviews with current and former delegates (minimum 15 interviews)
- 3. Methodological framework document** specifying:
 - Game-theoretic modelling approaches to be employed
 - Data sources and analytical methods
 - Assumptions and limitations
 - Validation procedures

PHASE 2: GAME-THEORETIC MODELLING AND ANALYSIS (MONTHS 3-5)

- 4. Strategic interaction models** including:
 - Public goods/common-pool resource game analysis of tuna stock management
 - Coalition formation and stability analysis under consensus and voting rules
 - Voting power indices under dual-chamber system
 - Repeated-game analysis of cooperation and enforcement
 - Mechanism design analysis of alternative institutional arrangements

5. Scenario analysis examining:

- Baseline: continuation of consensus-dominant status quo
- Scenario 1: Increased use of voting under current rules
- Scenario 2: Modified voting procedures (WCPFC members specify preferred modifications)
- Scenario 3: Enhanced side-payment or compensation mechanisms
- Each scenario assessed for efficiency, conservation outcomes, and distributional effects

6. Comparative case studies from other RFMOs including:

- SPRFMO conciliation procedures
- ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO voting practices
- Analysis of institutional reforms and their effects on decision-making

PHASE 3: SYNTHESIS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (MONTHS 6-7)

7. Initial findings report including:

- Briefing paper (maximum 3 pages)
- Preliminary results presentation (maximum 15 minutes)

8. Comprehensive final report including:

- Executive summary (maximum 5 pages)
- Institutional design analysis
- Game-theoretic modelling results with accessible explanations
- Scenario analysis findings
- Strategic insights for PICT delegations
- Policy recommendations for institutional reform
- Technical appendices with formal models

9. Policy brief (max 5 pages) suitable for:

- PICT government officials and WCPFC delegates
- FFA and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
- Regional technical experts
- Civil society organizations

10. Strategic guidance document for PICT delegations including:

- When and how to push for votes strategically
- Coalition-building strategies under current and alternative rules
- Risk assessment of different strategic choices
- Negotiation tactics for consensus versus voting scenarios

11. Presentation materials including:

- Technical presentation for fisheries officials and delegates (maximum 50 minutes)



- Executive presentation for political leaders (maximum 25 minutes)
- Workshop materials for FFA strategy sessions

PHASE 4: DISSEMINATION AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT (MONTH 7)

12. Stakeholder presentations (remote delivery possible) including:

- FFA technical workshop on voting strategy
- Presentation to other WCPFC members or observers
- Academic conference presentation
- Webinar for Pacific civil society organizations

13. Peer-reviewable journal article manuscript suitable for submission to journals such as *Marine Policy*, *International Organization*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, or similar

3.2 Geographic and Institutional Coverage

PRIMARY FOCUS:

- Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission decision-making processes
- Forum Fisheries Agency member coordination and strategy
- Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) coalition dynamics

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:

- South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO)
- International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
- Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)
- Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)
- Other relevant RFMOs and international environmental agreements

KEY MEMBER GROUPINGS FOR ANALYSIS:

- FFA members (17 Pacific Islands countries and territories)
- PNA members (8 equatorial Pacific Islands countries plus Tokelau)
- Distant water fishing nations (China, Chinese Taipei, Japan, Korea, USA, EU)
- Other coastal states (Indonesia, Philippines, etc.)

3.3 Temporal Scope

- **Historical Analysis:** WCPFC decision-making since establishment (2004-2024)
- **Current Assessment:** 2023-2024 baseline analysis
- **Forward-Looking Analysis:** Strategic implications for upcoming WCPFC meetings and medium-term institutional reform (2025-2030)

3.4 Methodological Requirements

Proposals must demonstrate capability to employ:

1. Game-Theoretic Modelling:

- Public goods and common-pool resource games
- Coalition formation games (characteristic or partition functions)
- Voting power indices (Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, or similar)
- Repeated game and dynamic models
- Mechanism design and transfer scheme analysis
- Spatial voting models (if appropriate)

2. Institutional Analysis:

- Rational choice institutionalism
- Comparative institutional analysis
- Process tracing of key negotiation episodes
- Document analysis of meeting reports and member statements

3. Empirical Methods:

- Qualitative comparative analysis
- Semi-structured elite interviews
- Preference mapping and coalition analysis
- Historical case study analysis

4. Validation and Communication:

- Stakeholder validation workshops
- Accessible explanation of formal models for non-technical audiences
- Scenario analysis with clear policy implications
- Sensitivity analysis of model assumptions

Critical Requirement: While rigorous game-theoretic analysis is essential, the consultant must be able to translate formal models into accessible, policy-relevant insights that can inform strategic decision-making by PICT delegations without requiring technical expertise in game theory.

4. REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS

4.1 Lead Researcher/Team Lead Requirements

The lead researcher must demonstrate:

1. Academic Credentials:

- PhD in Economics, Political Science, Game Theory, or closely related field with focus on strategic interaction and institutional analysis



- Minimum 8 years professional experience in game-theoretic analysis or institutional economics

2. Relevant Expertise:

- **Essential:** Proven track record of published research applying game theory to international cooperation, environmental agreements, or natural resource management
- **Essential:** Experience with coalition formation models and voting power analysis
- **Highly Desirable:** Knowledge of fisheries economics or RFMO governance
- **Highly Desirable:** Understanding of Pacific Island political and economic contexts
- **Desirable:** Experience with international environmental negotiations

3. Technical Capabilities:

- Advanced proficiency in game-theoretic modelling and analysis
- Experience with coalition game analysis and voting power indices
- Ability to develop and validate formal models
- Familiarity with institutional economics and public choice theory

4. Communication Skills:

- **Essential:** Demonstrated ability to explain complex game-theoretic concepts to non-technical audiences
- Track record of policy-relevant research that informs real-world decision-making
- Experience engaging with government officials, negotiators, or international organization delegates
- Ability to provide strategic advice based on theoretical analysis

4.2 Team Composition (if applicable)

Strong preference will be given to teams that include:

- **Lead game theorist** with expertise in coalition games and voting analysis
- **International relations/institutions specialist** with knowledge of RFMO governance
- **Pacific Islands specialist** with regional knowledge and networks
- **Research associate** for stakeholder engagement and interview analysis

4.3 Institutional Requirements

Applicants must demonstrate:

- Institutional affiliation with recognized research organization, university, or consulting firm
- Proof of liability insurance
- Capacity to manage the proposed budget and timeline
- Ability to maintain confidentiality regarding sensitive diplomatic and strategic information



- **Highly desirable:** Experience working with Pacific Island governments, FFA, or other regional organizations

5. PROPOSAL REQUIREMENTS

5.1 Technical Proposal (Maximum 25 pages, excluding CVs and annexes)

SECTION 1: UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROJECT (MAXIMUM 4 PAGES)

- Demonstration of understanding of WCPFC governance challenges
- Discussion of significance of voting versus consensus dynamics
- Identification of key analytical challenges and how they will be addressed
- Explanation of how game theory can provide actionable insights for PICT delegations

SECTION 2: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH (MAXIMUM 12 PAGES)

- Detailed description of game-theoretic models to be employed
- Justification for selection of specific modelling approaches
- Explanation of how models will capture WCPFC institutional features
- Data sources and collection strategies (including interview protocols)
- Scenario construction methodology
- Validation and sensitivity analysis procedures
- Discussion of assumptions and limitations
- Strategy for making formal models accessible to policy audiences

SECTION 3: WORK PLAN AND TIMELINE (MAXIMUM 4 PAGES)

- Phased implementation plan with milestones
- Detailed timeline with deliverable schedule
- Stakeholder engagement plan (including interview strategy)
- Risk mitigation strategies
- Quality assurance mechanisms

SECTION 4: TEAM QUALIFICATIONS AND MANAGEMENT (MAXIMUM 5 PAGES)

- Team composition and roles
- Organizational structure and reporting lines
- Quality control mechanisms
- Previous relevant project experience (particularly policy-relevant game-theoretic analysis)
- Examples of successfully translating complex models into policy advice

SECTION 5: DISSEMINATION AND IMPACT STRATEGY (MAXIMUM 3 PAGES)

- Plan for engaging PICT governments and FFA
- Strategy for academic publication
- Approach to supporting PICT strategic decision-making



- Communication and outreach plan

ANNEXES:

- Detailed CVs of key personnel (maximum 3 pages each)
- Examples of previous relevant work (particularly accessible policy-oriented game-theoretic analysis)
- Interview protocol outline
- Letters of support from partner organizations (if applicable)
- Preliminary stakeholder access or MOUs (if already secured)

5.2 Financial Proposal (Separate Submission)

1. Detailed Budget including:

- Personnel costs (with daily/hourly rates and time allocation)
- Travel and subsistence (itemized for stakeholder engagement, interviews, workshops, presentations)
- Data acquisition costs
- Publication and dissemination costs
- Institutional overhead
- Contingency (maximum 10%)

2. Budget Narrative explaining and justifying major cost items

3. Payment Schedule linked to deliverables

5.3 Format Requirements

- Language: English
- Font: 12-point Times New Roman or Arial
- Spacing: 1.5 line spacing
- Margins: 2.5 cm (1 inch) on all sides
- Page numbering required
- Electronic submission in PDF format

6. EVALUATION CRITERIA

Proposals will be evaluated using the following weighted criteria:

Criterion	Weight	Evaluation Factors
Technical Approach & Methodology	40%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Rigor and appropriateness of game-theoretic approaches• Innovation in modelling WCPFC institutional features• Feasibility of stakeholder engagement strategy• Quality assurance and validation mechanisms

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategy for translating technical analysis into policy insights
Qualifications & Experience	30%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead researcher credentials and publication record in game theory • Team expertise in institutional analysis and voting behaviour • Track record of policy-relevant research • Knowledge of RFMO governance or Pacific context • Institutional capacity
Understanding & Approach	15%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Depth of understanding of WCPFC governance challenges • Awareness of PICT perspectives and strategic priorities • Recognition of political sensitivities around voting • Clarity about how analysis will inform decision-making
Work Plan & Management	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarity and feasibility of timeline • Logical sequencing of activities • Risk identification and mitigation • Realistic resource allocation
Budget & Value	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost-effectiveness and value for money • Budget justification and transparency • Efficient use of resources • No unallowable costs

Minimum qualifying score: 70/100

Note: Financial proposals will only be opened for technically qualified proposals scoring 70 or above.

7. SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS

7.1 Submission Requirements

Submit the following as separate PDF files:

1. Technical Proposal (with all required sections and annexes)
2. Financial Proposal (clearly marked "FINANCIAL PROPOSAL - DO NOT OPEN WITH TECHNICAL REVIEW")
3. Completed Proposal Submission Form (template provided on website)

7.2 Submission Method

Email submission to: brina@sharkspacific.org



Subject line: "RFP Response - WCPFC Voting Game Theory Analysis - [Applicant Name]"

File naming convention:

- Technical_Proposal_[ApplicantName]_[Date].pdf
- Financial_Proposal_[ApplicantName]_[Date].pdf
- Submission_Form_[ApplicantName]_[Date].pdf

7.3 Deadline

Proposals must be received by 30 April 2026 at 1700 PDT via email.

Late submissions will not be considered. Applicants will receive confirmation of receipt within 24 hours.

7.4 Questions and Clarifications

Questions regarding this RFP should be submitted via email to: bubba@sharkspacific.org

Question deadline: 17 April 2026 at 1700 PDT

Answers will be sent by email from Sharks Pacific by: 24 April 2026 at 1700

All questions and answers will be shared with all prospective applicants to ensure fairness. Direct communication with Sharks Pacific staff regarding the RFP outside the official question process is prohibited.

8. TERMS AND CONDITIONS

8.1 Contract Terms

The successful applicant will be engaged under a professional services contract with the following key terms:

- **Intellectual Property:** All research outputs, data, and materials produced under this contract will be owned by Sharks Pacific, with rights granted to the researcher for academic publication after a 3-month embargo period
- **Data Sharing:** All datasets, models, code, and documentation must be delivered in open, accessible formats
- **Confidentiality:** Researchers must maintain strict confidentiality regarding sensitive diplomatic information, negotiation strategies, and any information provided in confidence by interview subjects
- **Ethics:** Research must comply with relevant ethical standards for human subjects research, including informed consent for interviews
- **Strategic Sensitivity:** Researchers must be mindful that analysis and recommendations may inform sensitive strategic and diplomatic decisions



8.2 Payment Terms

Payments will be made based on deliverable milestones and receipt of invoice:

- 25% upon contract signing and acceptance of Phase 1 deliverables
- 35% upon acceptance of Phase 2 deliverables
- 30% upon acceptance of Phase 3 deliverables
- 10% upon completion of Phase 4 and final acceptance

8.3 Rights and Reservations

Sharks Pacific reserves the right to:

- Request clarifications or revisions to proposals
- Negotiate with shortlisted applicants
- Request oral presentations from shortlisted candidates
- Reject all proposals if deemed not meeting requirements
- Cancel or modify this RFP at any time prior to contract award
- Award to the proposal representing best value (not necessarily lowest cost)

8.4 Eligibility

This RFP is open to:

- Individual consultants
- Academic institutions
- Research organizations
- Consulting firms
- Consortia or partnerships (with clear lead organization identified)

9. CONTEXT AND EXPECTED USE OF RESEARCH

9.1 Policy Context

This research will inform:

- **PICT strategic decision-making** regarding whether and when to push for votes at WCPFC
- **FFA coordination strategy** on consensus versus voting approaches
- **Institutional reform proposals** for WCPFC procedures
- **Coalition-building strategies** among like-minded members
- **National fisheries policy** development regarding regional governance
- **Academic understanding** of RFMO decision-making dynamics
- **Civil society advocacy** for more effective conservation governance

9.2 Anticipated Impact

The successful research will:

1. **Illuminate the strategic structure** of WCPFC decision-making in ways that clarify opportunities and constraints for PICT action
2. **Provide evidence-based foundation** for decisions about when consensus-seeking becomes counterproductive and voting becomes necessary
3. **Support PICT sovereignty** by identifying how institutional rules affect the ability of resource-owning nations to adopt needed conservation measures
4. **Inform institutional reform** by analysing alternative decision-making procedures and their likely effects
5. **Advance academic knowledge** by applying game-theoretic analysis to a major RFMO and contributing to literatures on international cooperation and environmental governance
6. **Strengthen regional coordination** by clarifying coalition dynamics and strategic opportunities

9.3 Alignment with Regional Priorities

This research directly supports:

- **Pacific Islands Forum Leaders' commitments** to effective governance of tuna resources
- **Forum Fisheries Agency's mandate** to promote regional cooperation and sustainable management
- **2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent** objectives on ocean governance
- **Regional Roadmap for Sustainable Pacific Fisheries** goals for improved RFMO performance
- **PICT sovereignty** over marine resources within their EEZs

9.4 Critical Note on Policy Relevance

This project seeks rigorous game-theoretic analysis in service of practical policy objectives. While formal modelling is essential, the ultimate value of the research lies in its ability to:

- Inform actual strategic decisions by PICT delegations
- Clarify the real-world implications of institutional design choices
- Provide actionable guidance on coalition-building and negotiation tactics
- Support evidence-based advocacy for institutional reforms
- Applicants should demonstrate not only technical mastery of game theory but also commitment to translating theoretical insights into accessible, policy-relevant advice.



10. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

10.1 About Sharks Pacific

Sharks Pacific is an independent research and advocacy nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing Pacific Islands sovereignty over marine resources and ensuring that the benefits from the region's valuable tuna fisheries flow equitably to the people and nations who own them. Founded on the principle that Pacific Islands Countries and Territories should be the primary beneficiaries of resources within their vast exclusive economic zones, Sharks Pacific conducts rigorous, evidence-based research that centres PICT perspectives in regional fisheries governance debates. Our work challenges the historical imbalance whereby distant water fishing nations and multinational corporations have captured the majority of economic value from Pacific tuna stocks, while the resource-owning nations receive only a fraction of the benefits generated from their natural capital.

Our mission is to understand the importance of sharks in Pacific communities, and to advocate for the conservation and responsible management of sharks and the related marine environment through research, outreach and advocacy. The goal of our approach in this project is threefold: first, to produce independent, high-quality economic and policy analysis that fills critical knowledge gaps and provides PICTs with the evidence needed to negotiate from positions of strength; second, to amplify Pacific Islands voices in regional and international fisheries forums, ensuring that PICT priorities shape conservation and management decisions affecting their resources; and third, to support capacity development within Pacific Islands governments and civil society organizations to exercise effective stewardship over their marine estates.

10.2 Contact Information

Primary Contact:

Bubba Cook
Policy Director
Sharks Pacific
bubba@sharkspacific.org
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11. APPENDICES

Appendix A: Key Data Sources and Information Requirements

The consultant will need to access and analyse the following categories of data:

WCPFC Meeting and Negotiation Records:

- Annual Commission meeting reports (2004-2024)
- Scientific Committee (SC) meeting reports
- Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) meeting reports
- Northern Committee meeting reports

- Records of small working groups and informal consultations (where available)
- Chair's summaries and reports on agenda items
- Documentation of instances where voting was used, threatened, proposed, or strategically avoided

Member State Positions and Statements:

- Statements delivered during Commission meetings
- Written submissions (proposals, amendments, position papers)
- Explanatory statements when consensus fails or measures are blocked
- Joint statements and coalition position papers
- Historical patterns of alignment and bloc voting

Institutional Rules and Procedures:

- WCPFC Convention (full text)
- WCPFC Rules of Procedure (current and historical versions)
- Legal interpretations of voting procedures
- Dual-chamber voting mechanism
- Two-vote narrow defeat protection
- Question deferral rule
- Procedural versus substantive vote distinctions

Issue-Specific Negotiation Histories:

- Tropical tuna management and harvest control rules
- Applicable stock recovery or rebuilding efforts
- Observer coverage requirements
- Transshipment regulations
- FAD management measures
- High seas compliance and enforcement
- Shark conservation measures

Coalition and Bloc Information:

- FFA coordination positions and strategies
- PNA positions and Vessel Day Scheme interactions
- DWFN coordination and alignments
- Bilateral agreements affecting WCPFC behaviour
- Regional diplomatic groupings and their evolution

Comparative RFMO Information:

- Decision-making rules and procedures in SPRFMO, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, NEAFC
- Cases of voting versus consensus in other RFMOs
- Institutional reforms and their effects
- Performance evaluations of different decision-making systems



Note: Sharks Pacific may be able to facilitate access to certain restricted documents and stakeholder contacts, but applicants should indicate existing relationships or access to WCPFC materials and delegates.

Appendix B: Interview and Stakeholder Engagement Requirements

Minimum Interview Requirements: The consultant must conduct at least 15 semi-structured interviews with:

- Current WCPFC delegates from PICTs (minimum 5)
- Current WCPFC delegates from DWFNs (minimum 3)
- FFA officials (minimum 2)
- PNA officials (1-2)
- WCPFC Secretariat staff (1-2)
- Former WCPFC chairs or delegates with historical perspective (2-3)
- Observers (NGOs, scientific advisors) (1-2)

Interview Protocol Requirements:

- Informed consent procedures
- Confidentiality protections
- Semi-structured format allowing for emergent themes
- Focus areas:
 - Perceptions of consensus versus voting
 - Strategic considerations in blocking or supporting measures
 - Coalition formation and stability
 - Informal bargaining and side payments
 - Reputational concerns
 - Red lines and political sensitivities
 - Appetite for institutional reform

Validation Workshop: At least one validation workshop with PICT officials and technical experts to test preliminary findings and strategic recommendations.

Appendix C: Illustrative Game-Theoretic Modelling Approaches

The following illustrates potential modelling approaches (not prescriptive):

1. PUBLIC GOODS/COMMON-POOL RESOURCE GAME:

- Model WCPFC tuna stocks as common-pool resources
- Analyse non-cooperative versus cooperative equilibria
- Examine how consensus versus voting affects movement toward cooperation
- Identify payoff structures behind key conservation debates

2. COALITION FORMATION GAMES:

- Characteristic function or partition function games
- Stability analysis (internal and external stability)
- Shapley value or other allocation mechanisms
- Analysis of stable coalitions under dual-chamber voting
- Effects of side payments on coalition stability

3. VOTING POWER INDICES:

- Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf indices for dual-chamber system
- Identification of pivotal players
- Comparison of voting power under alternative chamber definitions or thresholds
- Analysis of power asymmetries between PICTs and DWFNs

4. REPEATED GAME MODELS:

- Model WCPFC as repeated interaction
- Analyse sustainability of cooperation through trigger strategies
- Examine effects of voting on future cooperation and compliance
- Model reputation effects and credible threats

5. MECHANISM DESIGN:

- Analysis of side-payment or transfer schemes
- Design of compensation mechanisms to stabilize voting coalitions
- Issue-linkage possibilities
- Alternative voting procedures (conciliation, modified thresholds, etc.)

Appendix D: Reference Documents

Applicants are encouraged to review:

1. WCPFC Convention (full text)
2. WCPFC Rules of Procedure (current version)
3. WCPFC Annual Reports and Commission meeting summaries (recent 5 years)
4. FFA "Regional Roadmap for Sustainable Pacific Fisheries" (2015)
5. Academic literature on game theory and international fisheries agreements (e.g., Pintassilgo et al., Munro, Lindroos, Grønbaek)
6. Institutional design literature (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal)
7. Voting behaviour in international organizations literature (Voeten, Bailey et al.)
8. RFMO performance assessments (Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, Lodge et al.)

12. SUBMISSION CHECKLIST

Before submitting your proposal, please confirm:



- Technical proposal does not exceed the page limit (excluding CVs and annexes)
- All required sections are included and clearly labelled
- CVs are limited to 3 pages per key personnel
- Financial proposal is submitted as separate PDF
- Proposal submission form is completed
- All files follow naming conventions
- Email subject line is correctly formatted
- Submission is sent before deadline with time zone confirmed
- You have received confirmation of receipt

We look forward to receiving innovative and rigorous proposals that will advance Pacific Islands Countries' and Territories' ability to secure fair and equitable outcomes from the WCPFC decision-making process.

Sharks Pacific is committed to transparency, fairness, and advancing Pacific sovereignty over marine resources. This RFP process will be conducted with integrity and all applicants will be treated equitably.

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